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27 
JUSTICE ROBERT UTTER, THE SUPREME COURT OF 
WASHINGTON, AND THE NEW JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM: JUDGING AND TEACHING* 
Robert F. Williams** 
   The structural integrity of our federal system depends upon 
state constitutions and state courts providing an independent 
guaranty of individual rights. While the system’s state 
constitutional component was in danger of being overwhelmed 
by its national counterpart, the danger has subsided with the 
recent rediscovery of the rich heritage and unique protections 
offered by our state constitutions. The trend towards 
development of a principled body of state constitutional law 
needs nurturing if it is to continue to spread and mature. Each 
component of a state’s legal system—state bar, law schools, and 
judiciary—bears a measure of responsibility for breathing life 
into a state constitution. 
   Practitioners, students, and law faculty each have a unique 
role to play in the rebirthing process.1 
 
– Justice Robert F. Utter and Sanford E. Pitler, Clerk to Justice Utter, 
 Supreme Court of Washington 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Utter was appointed to the Supreme Court of Washington in 
1971, at age 41, after a successful career as a trial and intermediate 
                                                     
* This is an expanded version of a talk given at a conference in Seattle, Washington organized by 
Professor Hugh Spitzer, an accomplished state constitutional law scholar, to honor the contributions 
of Justice Robert Utter to the field of state constitutional law, both in Washington State and the 
nation.  
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School; Associate Director, Center for 
State Constitutional Studies, www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/. 
1. Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on 
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 677 (1987). 
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appeals court judge.2 This was a period when state supreme courts were 
undergoing an important transformation in their workload. A detailed 
study of that transformation concluded, in 1977, that state supreme court 
justices: “have come to view their role less conservatively. They seem to 
be less concerned with the stabilization and protection of property rights, 
more concerned with the individual and the downtrodden, and more 
willing to consider rulings that promote social change.”3 
A number of factors contributed to this change, including the fact that 
this generation of state judges had watched the Warren Court at work,4 
and was freed up to accept only the most important cases after the 
advent of intermediate appeals courts.5 
The 1970s also brought on the “New Judicial Federalism,” a 
movement in which state supreme courts began to recognize that state 
constitutional rights provisions could be applied to provide more 
protection than recognized by the United States Supreme Court under 
the federal Constitution.6 This important element of American 
constitutionalism had always been true, but it began to be highlighted in 
academic writing in the 1960s.7 The most important factor was the 1977 
Harvard Law Review article by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., where he 
called on state court judges to “step into the breach” and interpret their 
state constitutions to protect individual liberties even as the United 
States Supreme Court became more conservative.8 
I have previously referred to this early chapter in the New Judicial 
                                                     
2. CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON 
SUPREME COURT 166 (1988) [hereinafter SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING] (“Utter had not known 
the governor well and had not been active in party affairs, although a life-long Republican. 
Nonetheless, he had developed a reputation as an innovative and reform-minded judge. He began 
his judicial career as a commissioner for the King County Juvenile Court in 1959. Five years later 
he was elected to the Superior Court. His efforts on behalf of juvenile rehabilitation and reform 
were widely recognized.”); see also CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT, 1889-1991, at 333 (1992) [hereinafter 
SHELDON, HIGH BENCH] (short biography of Justice Utter). 
3. Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The Business 
of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 155 (1977); see also SHELDON, HIGH 
BENCH, supra note 2, at 19; SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 2, at 238, 340. 
4. G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS: J. 
FEDERALISM 63, 72–73 (1994). 
5. This was true in Washington. See SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 2, at 227–28, 
305–06. 
6. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113 (2009). 
7. Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First 
Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. vii, xiii (1996); WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 121. 
8. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).  
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Federalism as “The First Stage: The Thrill of Discovery.”9 Again, 
although the possibility of state constitutional rights above the national 
minimum standard of the Federal Constitution was a truism, there 
nevertheless was a feeling of the “thrill of discovery” during the 1970s 
and 1980s.10 Justice Utter’s many contributions to this discussion, both 
on and off the bench, were central to this development which Justice 
Brennan called the “most important development in constitutional 
jurisprudence in our times.”11 Together with state supreme court justices 
such as Stanley Mosk of California,12 Hans Linde of Oregon,13 Shirley 
Abrahamson of Wisconsin,14 Ellen Peters of Connecticut,15 and Stewart 
Pollock of New Jersey,16 Justice Utter provided the judicial seal of 
approval for this recently re-discovered phenomenon. 
I. JUSTICE UTTER’S BROAD ACADEMIC IMPACT 
Justice Utter served not only as a Supreme Court justice, but also as 
an important teacher for lawyers, judges, law professors, and political 
scientists about this new dimension of American constitutionalism. In 
fact, he taught Washington State’s first course on state constitutional law 
at the University of Puget Sound Law School (now Seattle University 
Law School),17 and later courses at the other two law schools in the state 
                                                     
9. Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 213 (2003); WILLIAMS supra note 6, at 119. 
10. Williams, supra note 9, at 213; WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 119. 
11. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 165 (1998). 
12. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1081 (1985). 
13. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. 
REV. 125 (1970); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). 
14. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of 
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985). 
15. See, e.g., Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law 
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583 (1986) (reviewing DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985)). 
16. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 
RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983). 
17. SHELDON, HIGH BENCH, supra note 2, at 336 (“Justice Utter has earned a national 
reputation for his scholarly applications of state constitutional law.”). 
 Utter has built a solid reputation on the supreme court as an innovative jurist, creatively 
mixing elements of conservatism with liberalism, defying common ideological designation. On 
the one hand, he is a constitutional intentionist, usually associated with conservative 
restraintists: the intent of the framers of the state constitution should be determined and applied 
in constitutional cases despite the demands of the current situation. In a number of such 
decisions the freedoms given individuals exceed those granted by the U.S. Supreme Court. For 
example, Utter maintains that the founders intended in Article 1, Section 7 of the Declaration 
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were directly modeled on his syllabus.18 He coauthored, with Hugh 
Spitzer, The Washington State Constitution: A Reference Guide,19 one of 
a fifty-state series. This became the go-to source for the history and 
judicial interpretation of the Washington State constitution. 
When I was first seeking a publisher for my casebook on state 
constitutional law, now in its fifth edition, and seeking support for the 
idea, Justice Utter wrote to me in 1985: 
One of the things I have observed is the lack of a textbook that 
would allow students and lawyers to view the subject in a 
systematic way. In a few states law review articles have been 
written which present a survey of that state’s law, but these 
states are in the minority and they would benefit, as well, by a 
national overview of the subject. 
In short, I support the idea of your book wholeheartedly. I 
believe there is a demonstrated need for it, and that conditions 
have changed so much in the last three years that, what may 
have been a questionable need then, is no longer in question.20 
This kind of support from the state bench for a law school course 
book proved invaluable. 
Justice Utter made a presentation to the 1983 Annual Fall Judicial 
Conference in Washington on state constitutional rights adjudication,21 
refined the presentation for a national audience at the 1984 Williamsburg 
                                                     
of Rights to protect the private affairs of persons and, consequently, to place greater 
restrictions on the intrusions of the state into one’s privacy than the Bill of Rights of the U.S. 
Constitution requires with its absence of direct reference to the right of privacy.  
 On the other hand, his historical analysis of the meaning of the state constitution leads him 
to fear not only governmental but also private transgressions into individual freedom. State 
action is not a requisite for court intervention, according to justice’s version of the state’s 
fundamental law. Thus, his conservative intentionist reading of the constitution often leads to 
liberal results. Such an apparent confusion of ideological labels lends credence to Utter’s 
contention that when applied to him the labels are too confining because they don’t describe 
the dynamics of what you’re working with . . . . I believe that my views are really constantly 
evolving.” 
Id. at 335. 
18. Letter from Hugh Spitzer, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, to Charlotte Lunday, Exec. 
Online Editor, Wash. Law Review (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review); Letter 
from Justice Debra Stephens, Supreme Court of Wash., to Charlotte Lunday, Exec. Online Editor, 
Wash. Law Review (Nov. 5, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
19. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE (2002). 
20. Letter to author from Robert F. Utter, Wash. State Supreme Court Justice (April 22, 1985) (on 
file with author). He knew I would attach his letter to my proposal to publishers. 
21. See Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on 
State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 491 
n* (1984) [hereinafter Utter, Freedom and Diversity]. 
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conference,22 then published it in the University of Puget Sound Law 
Review,23 and finally included it in the published proceedings of the 
Williamsburg Conference.24 This work reached four different audiences, 
and presented an early survey of almost all of the issues that would 
occur in state constitutional rights adjudication. It was extremely 
prescient in anticipating all of the big issues in state constitutional law 
such as lockstepping, the state action doctrine, use of state constitutional 
convention records, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, 
and many others. As always, he was well aware of the interaction of 
state constitutional law with the Federal Constitution. 
This veritable explosion of state constitutional law scholarship 
continued in his next article.25 Echoing his plurality opinion in the 
important Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council26 
case, this article is an early and deep analysis of the issue of free speech 
and association on private property, where federal First Amendment 
protections do not apply because of the absence of state action.27 The 
questions surrounding the requirement of state action, or a reduced level 
of state action, in state constitutional law are extremely important. 
Justice Utter also authored two exhaustive surveys of Washington State 
constitutional search and seizure law.28 
                                                     
22. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State 
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985). 
To provide a forum for examining this rapidly emerging body of law and for improving 
communication among the states, the Conference of Chief Justices, National Center for State 
Courts, and Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary organized a 
National Conference on Developments in State Constitutional Law, which was held in March 
1984, in Williamsburg, Virginia. That conference, which was attended by justices representing 
over thirty state supreme courts and by numerous constitutional law scholars, attorneys, and 
others, led to this collection of essays. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at VII. 
23. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 21. 
24. See DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 22. 
25. Justice Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional 
Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157 (1985) [hereinafter Utter, 
Right to Speak]. 
26. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P. 2d 108 (1981).  
27. Utter, Right to Speak, supra note 25. 
28. Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 1 (1985); Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 
Update, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411 (1988). These important surveys have been updated three 
times by Washington Supreme Court Justice Charles Johnson, who took over Justice Utter’s class at 
Seattle University Law School. See Charles W. Johnson & Debra L. Stephens, Survey of 
Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2013 Update, SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1581 (2013); Charles W. 
Johnson, Survey of Washington State Search and Seizure Law: 2005 Update, 28 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 467 (2005); Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1998 
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While serving as the Distinguished Jurist-in-Residence at the Indiana 
University School of Law—Indianapolis in 1987, Justice Utter 
acquainted the law students of his wide knowledge of state constitutional 
law in a lecture and later Article aimed at practitioners and future 
practitioners.29 Five years later, he described the slow rise in awareness 
of state constitutional law in his State of Washington: 
When I graduated from law school in 1954, there was no 
discussion of state constitutional law and only marginal 
discussion of the Bill of Rights. It was not until the late 1970s, 
some nine years after I first joined the Washington State 
Supreme Court, that parties in cases before us even began 
arguing for a principled basis for developing and discussing 
state constitutional law. . . . Even today, progress is slow. In 
Washington state, with three excellent law schools, there is still 
only one, University of Puget Sound Law School, that regularly 
offers a seminar course in state constitutional law. The two other 
law schools have interwoven portions of state constitutional law 
analysis into relevant classes, but offer no course focusing on 
state constitutional law theory and history.30 
In this same Article, Justice Utter joined the academic debate on the 
legitimacy of independent state constitutional rights adjudication, 
responding to the well-known challenge by Professor James Gardner, 
where he criticized state constitutional law cases as being without 
substance and state constitutions themselves as not really 
“constitutional.”31 He further provided a spirited defense of the Supreme 
Court of Washington’s “criteria approach” to state constitutional rights 
arguments when there is a similar federal constitutional provision in 
                                                     
Update, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337 (1998). 
29. Utter & Pitler, supra note 1. 
30. Justice Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State 
Constitutionalism: Washington’s Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1153, 1155–56 (1992) [hereinafter 
Utter, Principled Decision-Making]. “Five years later the challenge is still the same. If lawyers, 
students, faculty, and judges take their roles seriously, a principled development of state 
constitutional law in which a meaningful constitutional discourse takes place is inevitable.” Id. at 
1167. Later, the University of Washington, in 1996, and Gonzaga, in the late 1990s, added state 
constitutional law courses modeled on Justice Utter’s course at the University of Puget Sound. 
Letter from Hugh Spitzer, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, to Charlotte Lunday, Exec. 
Online Editor, Wash. Law Review (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review), Letter 
from Justice Debra Stephens, Supreme Court of Wash., to Charlotte Lunday, Exec. Online Editor, 
Wash. Law Review (Nov. 5, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
31. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 
(1992); see also First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 234–35, 840 P.2d 174, 191 
(1992) (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Gardner, supra). 
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State v. Gunwall.32 In the 1986 Gunwall case, the Court set forth factors 
that could help guide the courts and lawyers in applying independent 
state constitutional interpretations.33 Justice Utter strongly defended this 
approach in 1989 in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,34 a case relying solely on 
Washington’s constitution to overturn legislation diminishing the jury’s 
role in damage actions.35 
As with his in-depth analysis of free speech and expression on private 
property,36 Justice Utter also provided a very detailed analysis of church 
and state issues in Washington as well as in a national context.37 It was a 
vigorous call for protection of the free exercise of religion. He wrote 
convincingly about the role of judicial independence in state 
constitutional rights adjudication,38 and further contended that state 
courts should provide interpretations of federal constitutional rights even 
if they are basing their holdings on similar or identical state 
constitutional provisions.39 In all of his academic writings Justice Utter 
was careful to give credit to his law clerks and interns.40 He had clerked 
on the Washington State Supreme Court himself. 
Taken together, Justice Utter’s academic writings could have formed 
the basis for an influential book that would still be useful today in 
Washington and across the country. In my teaching, scholarship and 
advocacy I return to his body of work often. For example, when I was 
working on an Article concerning “lockstepping,” where state courts 
interpret their state constitutional provisions as identical or 
                                                     
32. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986); see also Hugh D. Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria 
Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!” 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 1169 (2006); Utter, Principled Decision-Making supra note 30, at 1161–66.  
33. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61–62, 720 P.2d at 812. 
34. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 663, 771 P.2d 711, 725 (1989). I have been critical of the “criteria 
approach, even though it provides an excellent template for advocates, because it can be read to 
create a presumption that United States Supreme Court interpretations should be applied to state 
constitutions in the absence of one of the criteria.” WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 146. Justice Utter 
made it clear that the Gunwall factors were “non exclusive” in his Sofie opinion. Sofie, 112 Wash. 
2d at 663, 771 P.2d at 725.  
35. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 636, 771 P.2d at 711. 
36. Utter, Right to Speak, supra note 25. 
37. Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the 
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451 (1988).  
38. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic 
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19 (1989). 
39. Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal 
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
1025 (1985). 
40. For a listing of Justice Utter’s law clerks, see SHELDON, HIGH BENCH, supra note 2, at 368–
74. 
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“coextensive,” with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
the Federal Constitution,41 I quoted Justice Utter’s criticism of state 
court decisions purporting to link state and federal constitutional 
interpretation in the future (“prospective lockstepping”) as a virtual 
“rewrite” of the state constitution without a constitutional convention or 
the people’s consent.42 He had also said, more broadly: 
In addition, one should be neither ignorant of nor intimidated by 
the case law and doctrines that may be cited by parties opposing 
independent interpretation. In most cases the problems they 
present can and should be overcome. For example, a number of 
Washington cases contain dicta, and sometimes actual holdings, 
to the effect that provisions of our constitution should be 
interpreted in exactly the same way that the federal courts 
interpret the federal Constitution, unless a very good reason for 
variance can be shown. While the Washington Supreme Court’s 
holdings must of course be followed unless overturned by that 
court, it is clear from a number of more recent cases 
that . . . .supreme court pronouncements should be scrutinized to 
determine whether they constitute actual holdings and, if not, 
whether they were based on assumptions that are no longer 
valid.43 
II. JUSTICE UTTER’S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OPINIONS 
Justice Utter’s 1981 plurality opinion in Alderwood Associates v. 
Washington Environmental Council provided a primer on the 
relationship between federal and state constitutional law in the area of 
free speech and association for the gathering of initiative signatures on 
private shopping mall property.44 There was an obvious connection 
between his writing on and off the bench,45 and he was teaching in both 
capacities. In Alderwood Associates, he made clear that there were good 
reasons for state courts to consider interpreting their constitutions to be 
more protective than the United States Supreme Court’s federal “floor”: 
When the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourteenth 
                                                     
41. Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case 
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping? 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005). 
42. State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 281–82, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring). 
43. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 21, at 507. 
44. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).  
45. See, e.g., Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 21. 
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Amendment, it establishes a rule for the entire country. . . . The 
court must thus establish a rule which accounts for all the 
variations from state to state and region to region. The rule must 
operate acceptably in all areas of the nation and hence it 
invariably represents the lowest common denominator.46 
He continued by observing: “[f]ederalism prevents the court from 
adopting a rule which prevents states from experimenting.”47 In holding 
that citizens could gather signatures for initiative petitions in private 
shopping malls, Justice Utter was careful to observe that this ruling was 
limited because “[i]f there were no limitations to their application, every 
private conflict involving speech and property rights would become a 
constitutional dispute.”48 
Justice Utter’s colleague on the State Supreme Court, Justice Charles 
W. Johnson, had this to say about him: 
Utter’s development of an independent interpretation of the 
State Constitution was probably as strong an influence on this 
court as could have been achieved by any individual. It was not 
a philosophy embraced by everyone because it’s not a 
comfortable philosophy. But the way Bob explained it in his 
writing was persuasive. As lawyers and judges, we’re most 
comfortable with the federal Constitution. That’s what we’re 
taught in law school. We’re not exposed to the State 
Constitution if we’re practicing law or judging at the lower court 
level. . . . What Bob Utter did before I came on the court was 
develop a language, or at least a foundation of the principles that 
explained not only what these words meant to the drafters but 
how they should be applied. And it made sense. . . . The door 
was not closed to the state constitutional interpretation because 
Bob Utter had kept it open.49 
Justice Utter was called on to author opinions in a wide range of state 
constitutional law matters beyond individual rights. 
Early in Justice Utter’s tenure on the Washington State Supreme 
Court he had occasion to inquire deeply into the inherent power of state 
high courts to order adequate funding for their constitutional 
                                                     
46. Alderwood Assoc., 96 Wash. 2d at 242, 635 P.2d at 115 (citing Project Report: Toward an 
Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 271, 290 (1973)). 
47. Id. 
48. Id.  
49. Robert F. Utter: Justice’s Sailor, WASH. SECRETARY ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/ 
legacyproject/oralhistories/RobertUtter/ [https://perma.cc/8SSK-CG7S] (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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responsibilities.50 After thorough research and analysis he concluded that 
the Washington Court had such inherent power to defend itself, but 
expressed humility in the exercise of such power by finding that the 
heavy burden had not been met.51 
Justice Utter did not miss the circumstances where subconstitutional 
legal sources such as statutes might provide important rights 
protections.52 In State v. Wanrow,53 for example, after performing a 
detailed statutory interpretation, he concluded that a taped “private 
communication” had to be suppressed pursuant to statute.54 It is 
extremely important to remember that independent and state-specific 
rights guarantees can be found in a state’s statutory or common law.55 
In 1978 Justice Utter dissented from a decision upholding “lewd 
conduct” convictions for young women who had appeared topless in a 
public park.56 He disagreed with the majority’s rejection of a defense 
based on Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment,57 as well as its 
statutory interpretation, concluding: 
If the convictions of these students are allowed to stand, these 
young women will carry with them throughout their lives a 
record of conviction for lewd conduct, yet, everyone concerned 
concedes that, but for the arbitrary definition of that crime which 
seems to have been adopted by the City of Seattle, the appellants 
neither acted nor intended to act in a “lewd” manner as that term 
is used in reference to the other acts specified. Such a criminal 
record, and the implication of a disposition to commit acts of 
extreme vulgarity which necessarily accompanies it, may do 
these appellants incalculable harm in future years.58 
In 1984 Justice Utter, interpreting both the Washington State and 
Federal Constitutions, held that a radio station could not be held in 
contempt for broadcasting tape recordings that had been played in open 
court.59 He enunciated a very early rationale for the primacy approach 
where state courts evaluate state constitutional claims first: 
                                                     
50. In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). 
51. Id., at 250–52, 552 P.2d at 173–75. 
52. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).  
53. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).  
54. Id. at 233–34, 559 P.2d at 555. 
55. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 140–41. 
56. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 610–11, 584 P.2d 918, 931 (1978). 
57. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1. 
58. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 611, 584 P.2d at 931. 
59. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). 
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Whether the prior restraint was constitutionally valid or invalid 
should be treated first under our state constitution, for a number 
of reasons. First, state courts have a duty to independently 
interpret and apply their state constitutions that stems from the 
very nature of our federal system and the vast differences 
between the federal and state constitutions and courts. Second, 
the histories of the United States and Washington Constitutions 
clearly demonstrate that the protection of the fundamental rights 
of Washington citizens was intended to be and remains a 
separate and important function of our state constitution and 
courts that is closely associated with our sovereignty. By turning 
to our own constitution first we grant the proper respect to our 
own legal foundations and fulfill our sovereign duties. Third, by 
turning first to our own constitution we can develop a body of 
independent jurisprudence that will assist this court and the bar 
of our state in understanding how that constitution will be 
applied. Fourth, we will be able to assist other states that have 
similar constitutional provisions develop a principled, 
responsible body of law that will not appear to have been 
constructed to meet whim of the moment. Finally, to apply the 
federal constitution before the Washington Constitution would 
be as improper and premature as deciding a case on state 
constitutional grounds when statutory grounds would have 
sufficed, and for essentially the same reasons.60 
He also made sure to note that the decision was based on “‘bona fide 
separate, adequate, and independent [state constitutional] grounds.’”61 
Therefore, the Washington State Supreme Court decision was final and 
could not be taken to the United States Supreme Court because there was 
no federal question. 
Finally, he articulated his “dual analysis” approach in which he 
analyzed federal constitutional law even though the case had already 
been decided on state constitutional grounds: 
First, our reasoning may be of aid to other courts with similar 
problems who do not have state constitutional provisions similar 
to ours and must rely on the appropriate federal constitutional 
provisions and decisions. Second, although the federal cases in 
no way influenced our decision under the Washington 
Constitution, such a discussion demonstrates that federal 
                                                     
60. Id. at 373–74, 679 P.2d at 359; see also City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456, 
755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988). 
61. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 377, 679 P.2d at 361 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)). 
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constitutional law also forbids a court to impose prior restraints 
on the publication of information lawfully obtained at public 
court proceedings.62 
When his colleagues on the Washington State Supreme Court struck 
down the use of state financial vocational assistance to a blind student 
who wished to study to be a pastor under the First Amendment, Justice 
Utter dissented both as a matter of federal constitutional law and also 
state constitutional law, providing an exhaustive analysis of 
Washington’s constitutional religion guarantees.63 The Court’s federal 
constitutional ruling, however, was not based on an adequate and 
independent state ground and was reversed by the United States 
Supreme Court.64 On remand, the Washington State Supreme Court 
reinstated its prior decision, but this time relied on the Washington 
Constitution’s religion provisions.65 Again, Justice Utter dissented, first 
arguing that the majority had not performed a proper Gunwall analysis 
(the Court’s earlier articulated approach to state constitutional rights 
claims),66 and then again delving very deeply into Washington’s 
constitutional religion provisions. 
In Sofie v. Fibreboard Corporation, Justice Utter struck down a “tort 
reform” cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury or wrongful 
death litigation.67  In this area, where the federal Seventh Amendment 
right to jury trial has not been applied to the states,68 it is only state 
constitutions that protect the right to jury trial in civil cases.69 Justice 
Utter provided a detailed analysis of the Washington Constitution’s jury 
trial guarantee, concluding that the challenged cap unconstitutionally 
deprived the jury of its authority to award damages.70 
In Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist.,71 Justice Utter held that 
a voting scheme in a special irrigation district where certain property 
owners could not vote for the District’s board members violated the 
                                                     
62. Id. at 378, 679 P.2d at 361–62; see also Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 456–57, 755 P.2d at 777.  
63. Witters v. State, Comm’n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 630–31, 689 P.2d 53, 57 (1984), 
rev’d 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
64. Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, reh’g denied 475 U.S. 1091 
(1986). 
65. Writters v. State, Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 368, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1989). 
66. Id. at 373–74 (Utter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
67. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989). 
68. Id. at 644, 771 P.2d at 716. 
69. See id.; Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Tort Reform and State Constitutional Law, 32 
RUTGERS L.J. 897 (2001). 
70. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 668–69, 771 P.2d at 728. 
71. 102 Wash. 2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984). 
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State constitution’s mandate of “free and equal” elections.72 This would 
have been permissible under the United States Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Federal Constitution,73 but, as Justice Utter pointed 
out, the federal Constitution does not contain a “free and equal” 
elections clause and, therefore, the “Washington constitution goes 
further to safeguard this right than does the federal constitution.”74 This 
kind of careful textual comparison of state and federal constitutional 
provisions has become a central feature of state constitutional analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1995, after twenty-three years on the Washington State Supreme 
Court, and despite his obvious love for teaching and judging, Justice 
Utter resigned from the Court in protest of the continued use of capital 
punishment in Washington.75 His numerous dissenting opinions from the 
Court’s death penalty decisions had not proved to be enough for him; he 
believed he could no longer participate in the judicial imposition of 
capital punishment. Thus, we were all deprived of his likely future 
contributions to state constitutional law as a sitting justice. Still, he has 
left us a prodigious amount of highly influential material relating to 
virtually all of the key issues that will continue to influence the area of 
state constitutional law far into the future. 
 
                                                     
72. Id. 
73. Foster, 102 Wash. 2d at 403–04, 687 P.2d at 846–47. 
74. Id. 
75. Robert F. Utter: Justice’s sailor, WASH. SECRETARY OF ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/ 
legacyproject/oralhistories/RobertUtter/ [https://perma.cc/8SSK-CG7S] (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). 
